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Optimal Inter-Release Timing for Sequentially Released Products
Abstract
Marketers routinely use timing as a segmentation device through sequential product releases.
While there has been much theoretical research on the optimal introduction strategy of sequential
releases, there is little empirical research on this problem. This paper develops an econometric
model to empirically solve the inter-release timing problem: it involves (1) developing and
estimating a structural model of consumers’ choice for sequentially released products and (2)
using the estimates of the structural model to solve for the optimal inter-release time. The
empirical application focuses on the movie industry, where we specifically address the issue of
the inter-release time between a theatrical movie and its DVD version. We find that consumers
are indeed forward looking; a shrinking movie-DVD release window does negatively impact box
office revenues, but there is a tradeoff in that there is greater residual buzz from the movie
marketing that supports the sales of DVD due to the shorter time window. This leads to an
inverted U shaped relationship between movie-DVD release window and revenues, and the
theater-DVD window that maximizes industry revenue for the average movie during the data
period is 2.5 months.
Keywords: Movies, sequential releases, entertainment industry, structural model,
segmentation.
Conflict of Interest Statement: On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that
there is no conflict of interest.
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1. Introduction
Marketers routinely use timing as a segmentation device through sequential product releases.
Customers who want to use a product early generally tend to value them more and therefore are
willing to pay more. For example, publishing companies conventionally release hardcover
version of a book first at a higher price and follow it up with the lower-quality, lower-priced
paperback version approximately one year later. Camera manufacturers often introduce a highend version of cameras targeted at professional users many months before introducing a lowerend version based on the same core technology. Until recently, in the motion picture industry, a
movie opens first in movie theaters and is released in the home video/streaming market later.1
A central question facing these managers is the following: when firms seek to implement
a segmentation strategy with release timing as their main segmentation tool, what should be the
optimal inter-release time? The problem has been of general interest to marketers in a wide range
of industries such as publishing, electronics and entertainment (e.g., Moorthy and Png 1992;
Lehmann and Weinberg 2000). Recently, the problem has gained considerable attention in the
context of the movie-DVD release windows. Since the DVD technology was commercially
introduced in 1997, the revenue stream from DVD sales and rentals has become pivotal for
studios’ financial performance in recent years. In 2004, while the US box-office gross remained
stagnant at about $9 billion, DVD rental and sales rapidly expanded to over $21 billion, making
the DVD market twice as large as the theatrical exhibition market. The enormous growth of the
DVD market has disrupted the traditional revenue structure and channel relationships in the
industry, and raises a number of questions both of practical significance and of scholarly interest;
in particular, whether and how studios should modify the conventional theater-to-DVD window
to adapt to the reality that there is greater revenue downstream. 2 The average movie-DVD
release timing has been steadily shortening over the last eight years from about 7 months in 1998
to about 4.5 months in 2005. The increasingly shrinking window has sparked much controversy
within the movie industry.3
1

The pandemic has upended this sequential model with many studios going straight to streaming or
simultaneously releasing in theater and streaming services.
2
The applicability of the model may well go beyond the theater and DVD stages and extend to other stages of a
typical Hollywood movie’s sequential release scheme, such as pay-per-view (PPV), video-on-demand (VOD),
premium channel premiere and network TV showing. We focus on the issue of theater-DVD window to simplify
the conceptual underpinnings of the econometric approach. Currently, the theatrical and DVD markets combined
account for over 90% of the movie-related revenue.
3
While many executives including the President of Universal Studios Rick Finkelstein, perceive that this trend of
shortening DVD releases has “gone too far,” others such as Disney have proposed shortening the movie-DVD
3

Despite the importance of the inter-release timing issue across a wide range of industries
and the especially heated arguments in the movie industry, there is little research that allows us
to address this problem in an empirically grounded fashion. Our goal in this paper is to develop
a structural consumer choice model that accounts for the tradeoffs in consumers’ decisions
towards sequentially released products, which would then enable us to solve for the optimal
inter-release time in an empirical manner. Our empirical application is in the context of movieDVD inter-release time.
We begin by considering the tradeoffs faced by managers as they decide on the optimal
inter-release time. First, managers would like to reap the gains from both markets as quickly as
possible (money today is better than money tomorrow) so would like to shrink the inter-release
time. However, moving up the second release would cannibalize the sales of the first (and highermargin) product because, after the second product is released, many customers who would
otherwise purchase the higher-end version would switch to the lower-margin version. This is the
tradeoff that has been modeled in Lehmann and Weinberg (2000). However, there two other
major factors which needs to be accounted in deciding inter-release times for sequential releases.
First, we need to model how buzz spills over from the initial release to the subsequent
release and how this is affected by the inter-release time. Many products like books and movies
receive considerable critical attention, advertising support, and media coverage as they are
initially released in hardcover or in movie theaters. These buzz effects not only affect the initial
release but also the subsequent release. Another source of buzz is the word-of-mouth that comes
from people experiencing the initial release. However, the buzz effect tends to decay over time
for most products. And it is widely recognized in the context of entertainment products like
movies and DVDs. As one studio executive put it, “Movies are like fresh fish; they become stale
if you don’t sell it fast.” Another studio executive compared movies to ice cubes – “The longer
it sits, the smaller it becomes.” Hence the loss from a delayed second release not simply comes
from time discounting, but, more importantly, from the lower sales potential for the second

window to a 4 month standard. At the extreme, Mark Cuban of 29/29 Entertainment has advocated a simultaneous
release of movies and DVDs. In fact Mark Cuban’s studio recently released Steven Soderbergh’s “Bubble” in
theaters only four days before it became available on DVD, but the movie proved to be a small-scale experiment
since it was boycotted by major theater chains.
4

release due to the buzz decay. We need to empirically measure the extent of buzz decay and the
effect of inter-release window on the potential of the subsequent release in our empirical work.4
Second, shortening the inter-release time has a dynamic impact on consumer choice. Even
before the second product is released, forward-looking customers are likely to delay their
purchases and wait for the lower-priced version if they expect the second product to become
available sooner. Now that the decision to delay is related to customer expectations of interrelease times, understanding the determinants of these expectations is important as well. There
is empirical evidence that consumers are indeed forward-looking when faced with choices over
time. For example, Weiss (1994) use questionnaire data from firms to support the hypothesis
that the firms that expect the next generation of technology to be available sooner are more likely
to defer their adoption of the currently best technology. Boone et al. (2001) demonstrate similar
behavior by consumers through laboratory studies. Thus, a model needs to be able to be account
for these tradeoffs in deciding on the optimal timing strategy.
In addition, optimizing inter-release strategies for movies and DVDs have certain special
modeling and empirical challenges, compared to product categories like books and electronics.
At least two critical modeling challenges exist in this context. To begin with, if the sequentially
released products are perfect substitutes, then one can model the consumer decision of when
(and what) to buy as an “optimal stopping problem”, because once the consumer decides to
purchase the product, there is no need to revisit the decision, and the consumer’s problem is
simply when to stop search and make the purchase. However, sequential releases are not
necessarily purely substitutable, for instance, a substantial proportion of consumers who watch
a movie in the theater actually buy the DVD later. In fact, for some people, enjoying a movie in
theater makes them more likely to purchase the DVD later. Thus theatrical movies and DVDs
cannot be simply treated as substitutes, which implies that this problem is a more difficult
consumer decision problem than the optimal stopping problem that has been extensively studies
in previous dynamic choice literature (e.g., Melnikov 2000; Song and Chintagunta 2003;
Gowrisankaran and Rysman 2005). Further, the degree of substitution (or even complementary,
depending on the direction of the dynamic interrelationship) may vary across products and across
consumers, suggesting the presence of heterogeneity in (even the sign of) cross-elasticities.

4

Note that we do not assume, that buzz will decay or inter-release window negatively affects DVD sales. The
sign and magnitude of these effects are empirically estimated in the model.
5

While recent papers such as Gentzkow (2004) and Song and Chintagunta (2005) have proposed
flexible models of the substitution and complementarity between static offerings, the model
cannot be readily adapted to a dynamic setting with sequential options and uncertainty about
future offerings as well as inter-release time. Estimating such a model with heterogeneity in
cross-elasticities between sequentially released products also leads to data and identification
challenges that we need to address. We show how a flexible structure of substitution and
complementarity can be accommodated in a dynamic optimization problem with consumer
uncertainty.
In sum, a structural model of consumer choice between sequentially released products,
particular in the context of movies and DVDs, should model (1) consumers’ forward-looking
choice behavior that takes into account

consumers’ adaptive expectations about the inter-

release times, price and product quality; (2) the possibility of multiple purchases over time,
implying that the dynamic problem is not an optimal stopping problem typically studied in
product line settings; (3) observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity in not only overall
consumer preferences for movies and DVDs, but the nature of substitution (substitutability as
well as complementarity) between them; and (4) the buzz spillover from movies to DVDs and
its decay over time.
We calibrate the models using sales and marketing-mix data on about 600 movies released
domestically in theaters and on DVDs during an approximately three-year period (Oct. 2000 Jan. 2004). Since it is empirically impossible to recover the distribution parameters of individuallevel preferences over inter-temporal movie and DVD choices using purely aggregate marketlevel data, we augment the market-level data with a cross-sectional consumer survey data set
that reveals information about consumers’ attitudes and habits regarding movie and DVD
consumption. We also introduce a novel estimation approach by using a simulation-based fixedpoint algorithm that nests the consumer dynamic programming problem within a GMM
framework.
Our key findings are that consumers are indeed forward looking; a shrinking movie-DVD
release window does negatively impact box office revenues, but there is a tradeoff in that there
is greater residual buzz from the movie marketing that supports the sales of DVD. Given this
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between movie-DVD release window and revenues,
and the optimal average window for the period of the data is 2.5 months.

6

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature
and the contributions of the current paper. In Section 3, we describe the empirical setting and
data. The econometric model is introduced in Section 4, and the estimation methodology is
detailed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the estimation results and policy analysis. Section 7
concludes and suggests future research directions.
2. Related literature
We next discuss the literature on sequential product introductions, also making specific
linkages to the application domain of movie releases. We then discuss the related modeling
literature on dynamic structural models of choice, and in particular sequential choices.
2.1. Sequential product introductions
Despite the importance of the inter-release timing issue for firms’ new product
development and marketing-mix strategies, academic research in this area has been sparse. In
the context of industrial markets, Weiss (1994) collected survey questionnaires from 85 firms
and shows that firms that expect a faster pace of technological improvements tend to delay their
adoptions of the current technology. Boone, Lemon and Staelin (2001) used a series of laboratory
experiments to support their hypothesis that consumers’ perceptions of the rate and pattern of a
firm’s introductory strategy can influence consumers’ adoption decisions concerning the firm’s
current offering. Prasad et al. (2004) propose a theoretical model that emphasizes the role of
consumers’ expectations on the demand for sequential releases yet offers no empirical recipe for
measuring such effects. In this paper, we propose a structural model of consumer choice that
enables us to quantify the effect of inter-release time on sequential decisions, which is amenable
to policy analysis such as solving for the profit-maximizing inter-release time.
There is a related literature that studies the demand for successive generations of product
advances (Norton and Bass 1987; Padmanabhan and Bass 1993) or for sequential product line
extensions (Wilson and Norton 1989). These models are usually based on overlappinggeneration diffusion curves and do not consider how consumers’ expectations about future
introductions would impact the demand patterns; particularly, the entry time of future products
is typically assumed to be exogenously given and not a decision variable in the model.
Specifically, in the context of our application domain of movie releases in entertainment
marketing, an extensive literature in marketing has been devoted to forecasting the performance
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of theatrical films (e.g., Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996; Zufryden 1996; Neelamegham and
Chintagunta 1999; De Vany and Lee 2001; Ainslie et al. 2004). In particular, both theoretical
and empirical studies have been dedicated to the release timing of theatrical movies with
emphasis on competition and seasonality (Krider and Weinberg 1998; Radas and Shugan 1998;
Einav 2003; Foutz and Kadiyali 2003). In comparison, there has been scant marketing research
on the home video market, though the home video market has larger share relative to the
theatrical market ($25 billion vs. $10 billion in 2004). A few studies have examined certain
aspects of the home video market. For instance, Knox and Eliashberg (2004) look at how
consumers choose between rental and buying at a video store. Mortimer (2004) studies the intertemporal price discrimination traditionally used by video distributors due to the U.S. intellectual
property protection (i.e. First Sale Doctrine) by estimating a data set of video stores’ rentals and
sales information. Chellappa and Shivendu (2003) study the economic implications of regionspecific technology standards for DVD piracy and conclude that maintaining separate
technology standards benefits both firms and consumers. But unlike the current study, these
papers focus on the demand in the video market and do not consider the interaction between the
theatrical and the home video markets.
Closely related to the current paper’s focus on the sequential introduction of movies and
home videos are by Lehmann and Weinberg (2000) and Prasad et al. (2004). Lehmann and
Weinberg (2000) formulate a mathematical model to study how the firm should tradeoff the
cannibalization of the earlier (i.e., theatrical) version, which is assumed to be of higher margin,
and a postponed revenue flow from the later (i.e., home-video) version, which is assumed to be
of lower. However, their model ignores the effect of consumer expectation and forward-looking
behavior, a critical element in quantifying the effect of inter-release timing. Prasad et al. (2004)
develops a theoretical model of industry-equilibrium video release timing strategy that takes into
account consumer expectations. Our current work can be viewed as complementary to their study,
since we develop a structural demand model, which accommodates product characteristics,
consumer heterogeneity, and expectation formation, to empirically test their hypotheses and
render policy recommendations. Rao (2016) estimates a dynamic structural model considering
the tradeoffs between purchase and rental markets, but focuses on the supply side question of
pricing online content for purchase versus rentals.
The current paper contributes to this literature by proposing a modeling framework that
explicitly captures consumers’ forward-looking behavior and allows for rich patterns of
8

interactions between sequential products (movies and DVDs) so that marketers and researchers
can infer the effect of inter-release time on the demand for sequentially introduced products.
2.2. Dynamic structural models of choice
Our approach to modeling consumers’ choice behavior is related to an increasing body of
empirical literature in marketing and economics that examines consumers’ forward-looking
choice behavior. In such models, the consumer’s current choice is allowed to depend on not only
the characteristics of the choice set immediately available to them but also on the expected
characteristics of future choice set(s). Most of the existing studies are focused on price:
consumers can adjust their purchase timing or quantity in anticipation of future price series
(Melnikov 2000; Hartmann 2004; Gowrisankaran and Rysman 2005; Israel 2005). These studies
have shown that ignoring inter-temporal substitution would lead to biased estimates of price
elasticities and misleading economic and marketing implications (Hendel and Nevo 2002).
Some of these studies investigate consumers’ purchase decisions about consumer durable
products (especially consumer electronics), which are often characterized by declining price
(typically accompanied by improving quality) over time; a forward-looking consumer, expecting
such trend, may postpone purchase in the hope of buying a cheaper and/or better product in the
future (Melnikov 2000; Song and Chintagunta 2003; Gowrisankaran and Rysman 2005). An
assumption made in these models is that adoption is a one-time event: once the consumer
purchases one unit of the product (e.g., digital camera), he or she drops out of the market
permanently, an assumption that enables researchers to solve the consumer’s dynamic
optimization program as an optimal stopping problem. This assumption is innocuous if the
consumer faces the same choice set or very similar choice sets over time, e.g., the consumer who
has bought a video game will never buy the same game again. Nevertheless, it typically does not
capture the consumer behavior towards sequential releases: for instance, a consumer who has
viewed a movie in theater may still want to buy the DVD released later; owners of a commercial
software package may still expect to purchase an upgraded version when it becomes available.
To model consumers’ behavior in these markets, we need to allow consumers to make
multiple purchases over time rather than restrict the choice process a priori to an optimal
stopping problem. In these settings (sequential releases such as theatrical movies and DVDs),
we cannot make the simplifying assumption that sequential products are pure substitutes. The
standard optimal-stopping dynamic choice models of product adoption, therefore, are
9

inappropriate for such problems. To achieve such flexibility, our model provides a framework
that allows consumers to make multiple purchases sequentially and thus captures a richer pattern
of substitutability and complementarity between dynamically related choice options.
In a static context, Gentzkow (2004) develops a model that allows for multiple choices and
captures a rich patterns of substitution and complementarity, which is impossible in a
conventional discrete choice model. He applies the model to assessing the relationship between
a print newspaper and its online edition. In his models, the utility from a bundle is specified to
include a discrete-form second-order Taylor approximation; for instance, the utility from a
bundle of two related products includes an interaction (or “synergistic”) effect, which would be
positive if they are complements and negative if substitutes. Song and Chintagunta (2005) extend
this model to include multiple brands nested in multiple categories.
Our model further extends the issue of multiple choices to a dynamic choice setting. Similar
to Gentzkow (2004), the current model accommodates a rich structure of substitution and
complementarity between choice options rather than assume them to be pure substitutes. In
addition, our model allows consumers to be uncertain about the availability of future releases
and incorporates consumer expectations into the choice model.
3. The Empirical Setting and Data
3.1. The DVD market
The DVD (digital versatile or video disc) technology, commercially introduced in 1997,
created a very profitable hardware and software market in just a few years. DVD players
became the fastest-growing consumer electronic product in history (The Digital Entertainment
Group 2005), outpacing even CD players and PCs);5 by 2005, DVD players were adopted by
75 million U.S. households (68% penetration rate) and pre-recorded DVD software had
mushroomed from 5,000 to over 40,000 titles. Over 3.9 billion pre-recorded DVDs had been
shipped to retailers between 1997 and 2004; a household that owns a DVD player bought 16
discs per year; the purchase rate was as high as 24 discs per year for households owning
multiple players. By 2004, while U.S. box-office gross remained stagnant at about $9 billion,

5

It took only five years for 30 million DVD players to be sold, compared to about eight years for CD players, and
10 years for PCs to reach the same volume mark.
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DVD sales had increased to $15.5 billion.6 The industry began to view films being “released
theatrically as a giant marketing exercise for DVD sales.”
Although over 90% of an average movie’s box-office revenue is obtained during the first
two months of theatrical opening, the theatrical-to-video window in 2004 was typically four to
six months (See Figure 2 for a histogram of the theatrical-to-video windows in our sample of
DVDs released from 2000 to 2004). But despite the predominant industry-level regularity in
the window schedule, there is still considerable variation across movies. For instance, the
window for “50 First Dates” was 123 days, and for “Mystic River” 244 days, with the latter
window almost double the former. Deciding the theater-to-DVD window is among the most
important strategic decisions for studio distributors. (McBride 2004)
The movie industry, as a whole, has been gradually shortening the theater-to-video
window (Gilbert-Rolfe et al. 2003). The industry-average window length in 2004 was
approximately four and half months, compared to a seven-month window in 1998.
Furthermore, some studios had begun to experiment with what were then revolutionary release
strategies; for instance, in Nov. 2004, a holiday movie called “Noel”, starring Penelope Cruz
and Susan Sarandon, were released into theater and disposable DVDs (priced at $4.99;
exclusive on Amazon.com) at the same time, and, a couple of weeks later, aired on the TNT
cable channel. Industry observers viewed the “multi-pronged release strategy” for “Noel” as a
“small-scale test that most of the Hollywood studios are mulling… to release movies to
theaters and homes simultaneously” (Video Business 2005). Another new movie, “National
Lampoon’s Blackball,” was released on DVD only four days after its theatrical debut.
Such a trend towards shorter theater-DVD release window angered theater owners and
worsened the channel relationship, since theater owners believe that studios are aggressively
cashing in the more lucrative DVD market at the expense of box-office sales. John Fithian,
president of the National Association of Theater Owners, said that “a shortened video and
DVD market impacts theater admissions… I get lots of calls from concerned members.” Even
some studio executives have expressed doubts about an ever faster DVD release. Frank
Finkelstein, President of Universal Studios, said to reporters, “As an industry, we may simply
6
DVD rentals totaled $5.7 billion, up from $4.5 billion in 2003. Couple that with DVD sales of $15.5 billion, the
DVD market over twice as large as the theatrical exhibition market. With DVD penetration spiraling, VHS market
has been dwindling: VHS sales dropped 42 percent to 240.4 million from 2002, while VHS rentals fell 23 percent
to 53.2 million (MPAA 2004). Therefore, the empirical study does not consider the VHS market.
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have gone too far with moving up DVD releases.” (Video Business 2005) How studios should
design their theater-to-DVD windows became one of the most critical channel relations issues
in the movie industry. In this empirical study, using data from this high-growth period of
DVDs, we examine the effects of inter-release time on various channel members via “what-if”
policy analysis, and provide a framework to addressing these heated and debated questions that
continue to have new relevance today with streaming platforms.
3.3. Data
Our sample includes newly released movie DVDs that were introduced between January
2000 and October 2003.7 The movies in our sample opened in theaters between 1999 and
2003.8 For each of the 526 DVD titles in our sample, we collect data on box-office variables
(e.g., box-office opening date, number of exhibitors’ screens, box office revenues, advertising
expenditure for the theatrical release, competitive set, and seasonality), DVD variables (e.g.,
DVD release date, retail price, sales, TV advertising GRPs,9 DVD content enhancements, and
distributor label) as well as movie attributes (such as its production budget, genres, awards and
nominations, star power ratings, MPAA ratings, and critical reviews). Data on marketing-mix
variables and DVD sales are from a proprietary data set collected by one of the major studios.
We also collect the average user ratings for each of the movie from www.imdb.com (Internet
Movie Database). Among the 526 titles in the sample, weekly rental data is available for 256
titles released for the latter half of the sample period. Table 1 reports the key descriptive
statistics of the sample, while Table 2 summarizes the relevant categorical variables used in the
empirical implementation. The DVD market is an oligopolistic market, with seven major

7

The study does not consider previously viewed DVDs for the following two reasons: first, the sales of previously
owned DVDs was approximately $2 billion in 2004; only 7-8% of the $26 billion DVD market. Second, previously
viewed DVDs usually contribute revenues to video retailers (or “rentailers”) but not to the studios, so they would
have a negligible impact on the studios’ marketing-mix decisions. Nevertheless, some consumers may strategically
wait to purchase previously viewed DVDs, and, as a result, the pricing and timing decisions of the new DVD release
might have an effect on the incentive to do so. However, modeling such effect requires a different approach that
resembles previous models on secondhand markets such as used automobile or textbook markets. And we do not
consider catalog DVDs (i.e., DVD release for movies more than two years old) for three reasons. First, new-release
DVDs account for a large majority of revenues while catalog DVDs represent a small proportion of total prerecorded DVD sales. Second, since catalog DVDs are released long after their theatrical release dates, the timing
decisions are affected by different factors than what is considered in our model; for instance, the DVD of “Assault
on Precinct 13” (1976) was released when the remake of the movie was about to open in theaters.
8
We focus on movies whose box office gross was above five million dollars because extremely small-budget
movies are usually marketed differently (for instance, such movies are targeted at a small niche market and are
usually supported by no advertising; they may simply go directly to videos, bypassing the theater channel altogether).
9 TV is the major channel for DVD advertising, representing 60-70% of the industry spending because of TV’s
ability to show DVD trailers.
12

studios taking up more than 90% of the total market. Table 3 presents the market share of each
of the major studio (label) in 2003.
The total market size for DVDs is taken as the total number of U.S. households with
DVD players installed. We collect monthly data on DVD player penetration rate in the U.S. to
control for the effect of a growing hardware installation base on the software sales. The annual
theatrical admission prices are collected from the MPAA annual reports and deflated with
CPIs. The nominal prices for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 are 5.39, 5.65, 5.8, 6.03,
respectively. Consistent with previous studies, we incorporate distribution intensity in the
theatrical demand model using numbers of screens exhibiting the film each week. Movie
demand is higher in the summer than in other seasons, primarily due to the long school recess
of teens and teenagers, many of whom are frequent movie-goers. Certain holiday weekends,
such as Easter, Memorial Day, July 4th, Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year also attract a
larger movie audience. We include dummies for summer and major holidays to control for the
seasonality effects.
We supplement this aggregate-level data set with a consumer survey sample of over
5,000 U.S. consumers collected by UniversalMcCann, a media and advertising agency, in
2003, and so contemporaneous with the movie period data. In the survey, consumers were
asked to rate the importance of each of a list of variables (such as star power, word-of-mouth
and advertising) in their decisions regarding movie-going and video-watching. They were also
asked how likely they are to view the home video of a movie that they have already seen in
theater. The answers to these survey questions fall into ordinal categories. Table 4 presents a
summary of the marginal distributions of these attitudinal variables.
4. The econometric model
In this section, we describe the econometric model. We introduce the model in the
specific context of theatrical movies and DVDs to facilitate exposition; however, the modeling
framework is generalizable to a broader range of marketing settings where consumers make
decisions about related products that are sequentially released.
4.1. Utility from viewing theatrical movies
The general environment facing a consumer is as follows: movie m opens theatrically at
time zero and runs for Tm weeks in movie theaters. At the beginning of week Wm , the movie
is released in the DVD market for rental and for retail.
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Our model is set up in a consumer-level random-utility framework, from which
aggregate-level market demand is then derived. Consumer i’s indirect utility from viewing
movie m in theaters (superscript T) during week t is given by
T
T ¢ T
T
U imt
= xmt
bi + x mtT - g i t - a P ln( pmT ) + e imt
, t = 1, 2,..., Tm

(1)

T
where xmt
is a vector of theatrical movie m’s observable characteristics that may affect the

consumer i’s utility from watching it in week t, such as distributional scale (i.e., number of
screens exhibiting the movie), production budget, advertising expenditure, critical reviews,
stars’ power rating, MPAA rating, genre, and whether it is a sequel. We use a discrete-time
specification for decision-making periods because data on box-office sales, screens and
advertising are customarily tabulated on a weekly basis. The parameters associated with these
movie-specific characteristics, biT , are allowed to vary across consumers. For instance, while
some consumers pay more attention to the presence of movie stars, others are more susceptible
to word-of-mouth recommendations from friends. x mtT is the econometrically unobservable
characteristic that affects movie m’s attraction at week t.10 -g i t captures the fact that the
appeal of pop-culture entertainment products such as movies may diminish over time and it is
consistent with the exponentially decaying box-office demand pattern characterizing majority
of feature movies (Krider and Weinberg 1998; Einav 2004). The individual-specific
coefficient, g i , allows consumers to have different decay rates over time. (Note that, while we
expect g i ³ 0 for most consumers, we do not make restrictions on it a priori.) pmT is the real
price of movie-theater admissions. Notice that movie theaters conventionally adopt a uniform
pricing scheme for all movies, which means that there is practically no price variation across
movies and very little variation from year to year after inflation adjustment11; therefore, the
price coefficient, a p , is not identifiable from the theater-window demand alone. We leave the
T
identification of the price coefficient to the DVD-period demand. e imt
is an idiosyncratic error

in the utility function and we assume it to be distributed type-I extreme value i.i.d. across
consumers, movies, and time with its scale parameter normalized to one.
The utility from not viewing the theatrical movie m in week t is given by
10

Such characteristics of movies may include news coverage of the movie and/or tabloid fame of its stars.
Orbach and Einav (2002) examine the uniform pricing scheme in the theatrical movie market and argue that this
regime is inferior to alternative pricing strategies.
11
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U iT0t = -y T ¢ SEASON mt + a CT COMPmt + e iT0t

(2)

where SEASON mt is a set of seasonality dummies and y T is a vector of the corresponding
coefficients that capture the highly fluctuating overall box-office demand (the negative sign
facilitates the interpretation of results, i.e., a positive estimate would mean that the total boxoffice demand is high). COMPmt is the strength of competition that movie m faces in week t.
In our empirical implementation, we use two proxies to measure competition: (1) the total
production budgets of all movies of the same genre released in the previous two weeks and (2)
the total production budgets of all movies of different genres released in the previous two
weeks. e iT0t is also assumed to be i.i.d. type-I extreme value error.
Since the choice outcome in a logit model only depends on the differences in utility
levels, we take the difference of (1.1) and (1.2) to obtain
T
T ¢ T
T
uimt
= xmt
bi + x mtT - g i t - a P ln( pmT ) +y T ¢SEASON mt - a C COMPmt + e imt

(3)

In each week during the theatrical run, consumers decide whether to view the movie in
T
T
theaters ( yimt
= 1, t = 1,..., Tm ) or not ( yimt
= 0 ). We assume that once a consumer has viewed the

movie in theater, he or she drops out of the theatrical market (while still remaining in the
market for the DVD). 12
Suppose that the consumer is myopic; that is, they make their movie-going decisions
purely based on theatrical viewing utilities, without considering the future opportunity of
renting or buying the DVD, then the consumer’s decision problem reduces to a static discrete
choice problem and the discrete-time hazard rate of viewing movie m in theater in week t is
given by the familiar logit formula
T
imt

Pr( y

T
exp(U! imt
)
= 1) =
T
!
1 + exp(U imt )

(4)

T
T ¢ T
where U! imt
= xmt
bi + x mtT - g i t - a P ln( pmT ) +y T ¢SEASON mt - a C COMPmt .
T
T
Let yim
º max( yimt
), t = 1,..., Tm , so that if consumer i has viewed the theatrical movie m
T
T
by the time it exits the theater then yim
= 1 and otherwise yim
= 0 ; the probability that

consumer i would see movie i in theater during its entire theatrical run is given by
12 We believe it to be an innocuous assumption; we also estimated a specification without this single-viewing
constraint, and the estimation and policy analysis results remain virtually unchanged.
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Tm

T
Pr( yim
= 1) = 1 - Õ (1 t =1

T
exp(U! imt
)
)
T
1 + exp(U! imt )

(5).

4.2. Utility from DVDs
The DVD of movie m is released at time Wm . There are two special modeling issues to
consider in specifying the consumption utility for DVDs. First, when the DVD is released,
consumers can either buy or rent it. Because of the institutional characteristic of the U.S. home
video market,13 the rental DVD and retail DVD are available to the consumers at the same
time. We model the consumer’s DVD consumption as a discrete choice problem. The
consumer’s choice set includes DVD rental (Rent), DVD purchase (Buy), and an outside
option.14 Second, the utility that a consumer obtains from the DVD may be affected by the
consumer’s previous experience with the movie. After having viewed a particular movie in
theater, the consumer’s utility from the DVD might be reduced to a certain extent due to
satiation; however, the exact amount in utility reduction can vary substantially among
consumers and across movies. On the other hand, she would even obtain greater utility from
DVD compared to the scenario where she had not viewed the movie previously (which might
be due to consumption complementarity, learning, or uncertainty reduction). Therefore, we
need to model this form of state dependence in the consumer’s DVD utility function in a
flexible manner.
Consumer i’s valuation of the DVD is assumed to be
T
T
T
VDim ( yim
) = exp(u!imDVD ( yim
)) × (d!i ( yim
))Wm , d! Î (0,1), Wm ³ 0

(6)

T
where exp(u!imDVD ( yim
)) represents the “attraction” of DVD m to consumer i if it is released at

the same time as the theatrical movie (the exponential specification ensures that the attraction
T
value is positive), and d i ( yim
) indicates the decay rate of the DVD’s attraction when its

release is temporally delayed from the theatrical release. Consumers’ awareness of the movie
and their purchase intention tend to be highest at the movie’s box-office opening and gradually
13 The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 stipulates that the owner of a legally owned copy of a copyrighted product is
entitled to “first use” (commonly known as the First Sale Doctrine), which invokes copyright jurisdiction only upon
the first sale of videos so that subsequent usage (such as rental) no longer generates revenue to the copyright holder.
This effectively prevents movie studios to discriminate between institutional buyers (i.e., video rental stores) and
individual buyers. See Mortimer 2004 for a detailed discussion of its implication on studios’ pricing strategies and
the difference between the U.S. market and the E.U. market.
14 We do not model the case in which the household first rents the video and then buys, or the reverse. We do not
think such a simplification severely compromises the validity of the model implications.
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evaporate over time; in other words, the faster the DVD release, the more it would appeal to an
T
T
average consumer. Note that both the attraction value, u!imDVD ( yim
) , and the decay rate, d i ( yim
),

depend on whether the consumer has viewed the movie in theater previously. The “attraction”
of the DVD is specified as
ìïu! R = x DVD¢ b R + x R - a ln( p R ) - ST × yT + e R , if y R = 1;
im
m
i
m
P
m
im
im
im
im
T
u!imDVD ( yim
)=í
B
DVD¢ B
B
B
T
B
ïîu!im = xm bi + x m - a P ln( pm ) - STim × yim + e im , if yimB = 1;

(7)

where yimR = 1 indicates that consumer i rents DVD m, and yimB = 1 indicates that consumer i
buys DVD m. In the above equation, xmDVD is a vector of DVD m’s observed characteristics.
Aside from the movie-specific variables considered in the theater-period demand, it also
includes DVD content enhancements such as filmmaker commentary, deleted scenes, music
videos, DVD-ROM features and children’s games. Moreover, the model also allows the
movie’s performance in the theatrical window to affect its performance in the DVD window; to
this end, xmDVD includes the logarithm of the opening box-office gross for movie m. x mR and

x mB are the econometrically unobserved components in the renting and buying utilities,
respectively, of DVD m. pmR is the DVD rental price15 and pmB is the DVD retail price. The
idiosyncratic errors e imR and e imB are assumed to follow i.i.d. extreme value distribution over
alternatives, movies, and consumers, with variance k 2 × (p 2 6) . STim indicates how the
consumer’s utility from the DVD is affected by the consumption of the theatrical movie. A
consumer may become less inclined to watch the DVD after having viewed it in theater due to
consumption satiation or substitution; in this case, STim > 0 . If STim is sufficiently large, then
the consumer would not consider renting or buying the DVD at all after having seen it in
theater. However, in some cases, a consumer may become more inclined to watch the DVD
after having seen the movie in theater, due to consumption complementarity or learning,
implying that STim < 0 . STim = 0 implies the lack of state dependence, i.e., whether consumer
i has viewed the theatrical movie has no impact on her decisions about the DVD whatsoever.
Note that this mathematical formulation is similar to the way that some previous studies have
modeled the state dependence in consumer choice of frequently purchased consumer-goods
15

Video rental stores typically set a uniform price for all new releases. Therefore, we let pmR = p R .
17

(Keane 1997; Seetharaman 2003). We let STim be a function of movie-specific characteristics
and an individual-specific intercept

STim = gi + zm¢ g + Dgim , Dgim ! N (0, s g2 ) (8)
where zm is a vector of movie attributes (such as genres and word-of-mouth reviews) and gi
is an individual-specific parameter.
Note that we allow different sets of parameters to be associated with the rental option and
the buying option to reflect the fact that these characteristics may have differential effects on
renting utility and collecting utility obtained from the DVD. (For instance, the filmmaker
commentary tends to be valued if the DVD is collected for long-run enjoyment, but it may not
significantly enhance the renting utility since renters rarely view the DVD a second time with
the commentary turned on.) By allowing different parameter values for these two different
options, we allow for a quite flexible structure on the renting vs. buying decisions.16
Suppose the utility function takes the form
T
U imDVD = ln[VDim ( yim
)

(P )

DVD a P
m

]

(9)

where the log functional form and the power coefficient of price, a P , are intended to model
concavity in utilities desirable to capture the wide price (and value) gap between the renting
and buying utilities. Given (6), (7) and (9), consumer i’s utility from the DVD, depending on
whether if she has viewed the theatrical movie, can be rewritten as
ìï(º u! R ) = x DVD¢ b R + x R - a ln( p R ) - d R ,0W + e R , if y R = 1;
im
m
i
m
P
m
i
m
im
im
T
(10)
U imDVD ( yim
= 0) = í
B
DVD¢ B
B
B
B ,0
B
B
ïî(º u!im ) = xm bi + x m - a P ln( pm ) - d i Wm + e im , if yim = 1;

and
U

DVD
im

ìï(º u! R ) = x DVD¢ b R + x R - a ln( p R ) - d R ,1W - ST + e R , if y R = 1;
im
m
i
m
P
m
i
m
im
im
im
(11)
( y = 1) = í
B
DVD¢ B
B
B
B ,1
B
B
ïî(º u!im ) = xm bi + x m - a P ln( pm ) - d i Wm - STim + e im , if yim = 1;
T
im

T
T
T
where d mR ,0 º - ln(d!mR ( yim
= 0)) , d mB ,0 º - ln(d!mB ( yim
= 0)) , d mR ,1 º - ln(d!mR ( yim
= 1)) , and
T
d mB ,1 º - ln(d!mB ( yim
= 1)) We also assume that the outside option provides utility

U iDVD
= e iDVD
0
0

(12)

16 Another way to model such difference is to view the buying utility as a discounted sum of per-period utilities
and explicitly specify the discounting patterns (Knox and Eliashberg 2004).
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where e iDVD
is also distributed extreme value with scale parameter k .
0
Therefore, the probabilities of renting and buying, respectively, DVD m for consumer i if
she has not viewed the theatrical movie previously are given by
T
simR ,0 = Pr( yimR | yim
= 0) =

exp[(U! imR - d iR ,0Wm ) k ]
1 + exp[(U! imB - d iB ,0Wm ) k ] + exp[(U! imR - d iR ,0Wm ) k ]

T
simB ,0 = Pr( yimB | yim
= 0) =

exp[(U! imB - d iB ,0Wm ) k ]
1 + exp[(U! imB - d iB ,0Wm ) k ] + exp[(U! imR - d iR ,0Wm ) k ]

(13)
(14)

where
DVD¢ R
U! imR = xmt
bi + x mR - a P ln( pmR ) (15)

and
DVD¢ B
U! imB = xmt
bi + x mB - a P ln( pmB )

(16)

The probabilities of renting and buying, respectively, DVD m for consumer i if she has
viewed the theatrical movie previously are given by
R ,1
im

exp[(U! imR - d iR ,1Wm - STim ) k ]
(17)
= Pr( y | y = 1) =
1 + exp[(U! imB - d iB ,1Wm - STim ) k ] + exp[(U! imR - d iR ,1Wm - STim ) k ]

B ,1
im

exp[(U! imB - d iB ,1Wm - STim ) k ]
(18)
= Pr( y | y = 1) =
1 + exp[(U! imB - d iB ,1Wm - STim ) k ] + exp[(U! imR - d iR ,1Wm - STim ) k ]

s
s

R
im

B
im

T
im

T
im

where U! imR and U! imB are defined in (15) and (16).
Given the conditional probabilities given in (13), (14), (15) and (16), we can compute
the unconditional probability for consumer i to rent and buy DVD m:
T
T
simR = simR ,0 × (1 - sim
) + simR ,1 × sim
T
T
simB = simB ,0 × (1 - sim
) + simB ,1 × sim

(19)

The total number of DVD rentals and that of DVD purchases are then obtained by
integrating over consumer heterogeneity

QmR = M mDVD ò simR (vi )dP (vi )
vi

Q =M
B
m

ò

DVD
m
vi

B
im

s (vi )dP (vi )

(20)

where vi represents individual heterogeneity and P(vi ) is its distribution function. M mDVD is
the potential market size, which is taken as the number of households that have adopted DVD
players by the time DVD m is released.
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4.3. Dynamic choice behavior of forward-looking consumers
Since a consumer utility from the DVD depends on whether she has viewed the movie or
not, a forward-looking consumer would seek to optimize her utilities inter-temporally; in
deciding about movie-going, consumer i who has not viewed movie m up to the t-th week of its
theatrical run would solve the problem
T
T
T
max {uimt
+ l E[max U imDVD | yim
= 1], l E[max U imDVD | yim
= 0]} (21)

T
yimt
Î{0,1}

where l reflects the relative weights of the two periods in the consumer’s decision process.
T
Given the distributional assumption on idiosyncratic errors, e imt
, the discrete hazard rate

for consumer i to watch movie m in week t during the theater window is given by
T
Pr( yimt
= 1) =

T
exp(U! imt

T
T
exp(U! imt
+ E[max U imDVD | yim
= 1])
DVD
T
T
+ l E[max U im | yim = 1]) + exp(l E[max U imDVD | yim
= 0])

(22)

Define !WAITim ( I mt ) as the expected utility gain in the DVD period if consumer i bypasses
the theatrical version intentionally, given the information set ( I mt ) available to her at time t, we
have (Rust 1987)
T
T
!WAITim ( I mt ) º E[max U imDVD yim
= 0] - E[max U imDVD yim
= 1]

= E[l + k ln{1 + exp[(U" imB - d iB ,0Wm ) k ] + exp[(U" imR - d iR ,0Wm ) k ]}]
(23)
- E[l + k ln{1 + exp[(U" imB - d iB ,1Wm - STim ) k ] + exp[(U" imR - d iR ,1Wm - STim ) k ]}]
1 + exp[(U" imB - d iB ,0Wm ) k ] + exp[(U" imR - d iR ,0Wm ) k ]
= k ò ln(
)dP ( Y mDVD | I mt )
1 + exp[(U" B - d B ,1W - ST ) k ] + exp[(U" R - d R ,1W - ST ) k ]
im

i

m

im

im

i

m

im

where l is Euler’s constant, Y mDVD is the set of state variables that affect the consumer’s
utility from the DVD, and P ( Y mDVD | I mt ) represents the distribution of Y mDVD given the
information available to consumers at time t (i.e., I mt ). Therefore, !WAITim ( I mt ) represents
the net (“waiting”) value of foregoing the theater-viewing experience, the consideration of
which distinguishes the choice behavior of a forward-looking consumer from that of a myopic
consumer. Then (3.2) can be rewritten as
T
T
simt
( I mt ) º Pr( yimt
= 1| I mt ) =

T
exp(U! imt
)
T
!
exp(U imt ) + exp(l "WAITim ( I mt ))
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(24)

If l = 0 , then (24) is reduced to (4), the myopic choice rule. Note that k , the scale
parameter of the error distribution in the DVD utility function, cannot be identified separately
from l or from the DVD preference parameters, so we normalized k to one in the empirical
implementation.
The theatrical market demand for movie m at week t can then be obtained by integrating
over the individual consumers’ choice probabilities
T
T
S mt
= ò simt
(vi ; I mt )dP (vi )
vi

(25)

4.4. Consumer expectations
In solving the dynamic optimization problem, consumers’ decisions would depend on the
expectations of the values of the future state variables, including the inter-release time.
DVD
Let Y mDVD º (Y mDVD
where Y mDVD
includes the characteristics of DVD m that are
,1 , Y m ,2 )
,1

known to consumers upon its theatrical opening (such as star presence and genres), and Y mDVD
,2
include the characteristics of DVD m that consumers are uncertain about prior to its DVD
release (such as DVD retail price and inter-release time). We assume that consumers have no
prior information about the idiosyncratic errors ( e imDVD ’s) except for their distribution and that
T
the errors are conditional independent, i.e., f (e imDVD | e im
, Y mDVD ) = f ( e imDVD ) .

Consistent with the majority of dynamic choice models in the literature, we assume that
consumers are rational in the sense that they are aware of the distribution of state variables in
the future. Therefore, we infer the realized stochastic distribution of Y mDVD
and then, under the
,2
assumption that consumers know this distribution, utilize it to solve the dynamic programming
problem of the consumers.17 The stochastic process that generates the DVD inter-release time
is specified as follows.

Wm = xmT ¢ rW + Trend m + uW ,m , uW ,m ! N (0, s W2 )

(26)

where xmW is a vector of movie m’s characteristics that affect the realized (and presumably
expected) window length of movie m. Such variables may include movie m’s box-office
17
Assuming rational expectations (i.e. the agent’s expectations are objectively correct) is a prevailing practice in
dynamic choice economic models. However, such maintained assumptions may be questionable, given that the
multiple forms of expectations can all lead to the observed choice behavior (e.g., Erdem et al. 2004). It would be
ideal if we had data on stated expectations (e.g., how soon consumers expect a particular DVD to be released);
however, such questions are not asked in our consumer survey data.
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opening strength (“marketability”), which is mostly driven by the pre-release marketing
campaign, and its momentum after the initial opening (“playability,” “longevity,” or “leg”),
which is primarily maintained by consumer word-of-mouth recommendations (Krider and
Weinberg 1998; Eliashberg et al. 2005). While the opening strength is easily measured by a
movie’s opening-weekend box-office revenue, the longevity of a movie is not straightforward
to quantify. We need to construct a measure of the movie’s “leg,” i.e. its box-office staying
power after the opening weekend. To this end, we fit a two-parameter Weibull distribution for
each movie. The Weibull p.d.f. is given by
t

b

-( ) m
b t
f (t | am , bm ) = m ( )bm e am , t ³ 0, am , bm > 0
t am

(27)

The Weibull distribution is a flexible function form capable of capturing a wide variety of
box-office sales patterns, as illustrated in Figure 3 with four examples. The scale parameter,

am , is also called the characteristic life, since F (am | am , bm ) = 1 - e -1 ! 0.632 , i.e., am is the
time by which 63.2% of the potential box-office sales would be realized. Therefore, it serves as
a reasonable measure to distinguish movies with strong momentum ( am will be large) from
those that quickly run out of steam ( am will be small). Table 6 shows the estimated legs and
window lengths for a sample of movies.
During the movie’s theatrical run, however, consumers are unaware of the entire boxoffice trajectory, so we allow consumers to update am each week as new information is
observed.
Suppose that in the first two weeks the consumers will use the population distribution of

am as prior
am ! N (a0 ,t 02 )

(28)

From Week 3, consumers would take the box-office pattern in the previous weeks ( I mt ) to
estimate am based on (27):
2
aˆm ( I mt ) ! N (am , smt
)

(29)

Therefore, the posterior distribution of am is given by (Gelman et al. 2003)

am | aˆm ! N (

2
a0 t 02 + aˆm smt
1
, 2
)
2
2
2
1 t 0 + 1 smt 1 t 0 + 1 smt

(30)
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2
Since smt
is typically large in the initial few weeks and becomes smaller later into the

theatrical run, the updating rule in (30) implies that consumers’ expectations will rely more on
the prior initially and gradually become more movie-specific.
Besides the inter-release time, the DVD retail price and the exact box-office gross (from
which consumers tend to infer the quality of the movie) are also unknown to consumers during
the theatrical period. Therefore, we assume price to follow a lognormal distribution and the
box-office gross to follow a normal distribution and integrate over these distributions to obtain
expected utilities.
4.5. Consumer heterogeneity
We incorporate consumer heterogeneity through a random-coefficient specification of
individual-specific preference parameters. Let qi º ( biT , biR , biB , g i , d iR ,0 , d iB ,0 , d iR ,1 , d iB ,1 , gi )¢ be
the set of individual-specific parameters. Suppose

qi = q1 + vi , vi = Shi

(31)

where hi is a normed (or unit) vector and hi ! MVN (0, L) ; by definition, diag (L ) = 1 . S is
a diagonal matrix that transforms that correlation matrix L , to a full variance-covariance
matrix. We describe how to estimate L outside the dynamic programming problem by using
consumer-level attitudinal data in the data section.
4.6. Other specification issues
Note that g i , the consumer-specific decay factor for the theatrical movie, tends to be
correlated with d i j ,0 and d i j ,1 ( j = R, B ). Therefore, we let

d i j ,0 = c0g i + c1,i , c1,i ! N (0, s c2 ), j = R, B
d i j = d i j ,1 - d i j ,0 = d 0 + d1Dd i j ,0

j = R, B

(32)
(33)

5. Estimation
5.1. The GMM estimator
T
Decompose each of U! imt
, U! imR , and U! imB into one component that is common to all

consumers and one component that captures consumer i’s deviation from the common
component:
T
T
T
T
T
U! imt
= hmt
( xmt
, pmT , SEASON mt
, COMPmtT ;q1 ) + µimt
(vi )

U! imR = hmR ( xmDVD , pmR ,Wm ;q1 ) + µimR (vi )

(35)
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(34)

U! imB = hmB ( xmDVD , pmB ,Wm ;q1 ) + µimB (vi )

(36)

Let q 2 = (S, g , l , s g2 ) ; note that q 2 governs the distribution of vi . The partition of the
parameters into two vectors, q1 and q 2 , is to facilitate interpretation of the estimation
procedure detailed below.
The estimation is implemented using generalized method of moments estimation (Berry
et al. 1995; Nevo 2001; Sudhir 2001). The GMM identification assumption is given by

E[ z ¢x ] = 0 (37)
where x = (x Tjt , x jR , x jB ) and z is a set of exogenous (or predetermined) variables that are
orthogonal to x .
Accordingly, the GMM objective function is defined as

G (q ) = x (q )¢ZAZ ¢x (q )

(38)

where we use the GMM optimal weighting matrix as A to obtain the asymptotically efficient
estimator.18 Since the window length is potentially endogenous, we construct a set of
instruments to correct for endogeneity bias. To find such instruments, we need variables that
affect actual window lengths set by studios but do not affect demand. A potential source of
such instruments is studio-specific characteristics (such as their financial prowess and
contractual relations with exhibitors). For instance, if a studio has greater financial leverage of
its productions then it may not be as eager to release its DVDs to recoup production and
marketing costs as a studio that is less financially endowed. Studio fixed-effects, however,
should not affect consumers’ decisions since they hardly consider the identity of the movie
studio when deciding whether to view a movie or DVD. Thus we include studio dummies,
their interactions with production costs, and their interactions with the movie “leg,” (computed
as in (39)) as instruments for window lengths.
The estimation proceeds as follows:
(Step 0) Simulate NS random draws for the individual-specific preference vector; pick an
T NS
initial value for d º [d mT , d mR , d mB ] , and for {sim
}i =1 , set !WAITim = 0 for all i and m.

(Step 1) Pick an initial value for q 2 ;

18

The 2SLS estimates are computed in the first stage by using A = ( Z ¢Z ) -1 , then the resulting parameter estimates
are used to compute the optimal weighting matrix, A = ( Z ¢x (qˆ2 SLS )x (qˆ2 SLS )¢Z ) -1 .
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T NS
(Step 2) Conditioning on q 2 and {sim
}i =1 , compute the predicted share, ( sˆmB , sˆmR ) given the

pair d mDVD º (d mR , d mB ) through Monte Carlo integration

1 NS R r
å sim (vi ;q2 )
NS r =1
1 NS B r
ˆsmB (d1T ;q 2 ) =
å sim (vi ;q2 )
NS r =1
sˆmR (d1T ;q 2 ) =

(40)

where simR and simB are computed from (19) given d mDVD .
(Step 3) Write sˆmDVD º ( sˆmR , sˆmB ) , calculate

d mDVD¢ = d mDVD + ln( smDVD ) - ln( sˆmDVD (d mT , q 2 ))

(41)

(Step 4) Iterate over Step 2 and 3 till convergence; write the convergent value vector as

d mDVD (d mT ,q 2 ) .
(Step 5) Compute the GMM estimator for q1DVD (d mT , q 2 ) through

qˆ1DVD (d DVD (×)) = arg min x (d DVD (×))¢ Z 2 A2 Z 2¢x (d DVD (×))

(42)

q ÎQ

(Step 6) Calculate the value of !WAITim by simulated integration of (23), conditioning on
T
by integration
qˆ1DVD and q 2 and compute the corresponding theatrical market shares smt

over (24)
T
sˆmt
(d mT , q 2 ) =

1 NS T
å sˆimt (×)
NS i =1

(43)

(Step 7) Evaluate
T
T
d mtT ¢ = d mtT + ln( smt
) - ln( sˆmt
(d mtT , q 2 )) (44)

(Step 8) Iterate over Step 2 to Step 7 till convergence.
(Step 9) Compute the GMM objective function in (38) as a function of q 2 ;
(Step 10) Search over the parameter space of q 2 to minimize the GMM objective
function.
The asymptotic standard errors are computed for the efficient GMM estimator.
5.2. Estimating the distribution of consumer heterogeneity from survey data
The major source of computational burden is the variance-covariance matrix of the
unobserved individual heterogeneity, vi . Suppose we have a sum of K random coefficients,
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then the number of parameters to be estimated in Var (vi ) then amounts to K ( K + 1) / 2 (e.g., 21
parameters if K = 6 ). Since the variance-covariance matrix is part of the nonlinear parameters,
q 2 , to be numerically optimized over, the huge number of parameters is a major challenge in

model estimation. One way to circumvent this problem is to impose the assumption that all offdiagonal elements in Var (vi ) are zero (e.g., Berry et al. 1995) and only estimate the diagonal
elements. However, such assumptions tend to be inappropriate and lead to biased estimates if
consumers’ preference parameters are significantly correlated.
One possible approach to solve this problem is to supplement the aggregate-level data
with consumer survey data that provides rich information about the distribution of consumer
heterogeneity. Harris and Keane (1999) develop an approach to combine attitudinal data with
consumer-level revealed preferences to obtain more reliable estimates of consumers’
preferences for choice alternatives. Here we propose a method that naturally incorporates the
information contained in ordinal-scale attitudinal data into the estimation of market-level data.
Since the survey questions were asked in the form of ordinal variables, we compute a
measure of the association between each pair of ordinal variables. The polychoric correlation
coefficient suits our need here since this measure specifically addresses situations in which the
latent variables of interest are continuous, yet measurement outcomes are ordinal. We can
compute a polychoric correlation coefficient between two ordinal variables, X and Y (with

M and N categories, respectively), which are related to two latent continuous preference
weights, b k and b j , by

b k Î [ x!m -1 , x!m ), m = 1,..., M
if b j Î [ y! n -1 , y! n ), n = 1,...., N

X = xm if
Y = yn

(45)

Consistent with (31), we assume that b k and b j are distributed bivariate normal (with
correlation coefficient, r kj ), we can estimate r kj , together with the thresholds, x!m ’s and y! n
’s, via maximum likelihood (Olsson 1979; Drasgow 1986). Since the polychoric correlation
coefficient computed as such does not depend on the number of rating levels and are scale-free,
it can be then plugged into the full covariance matrix of random coefficients.
The estimated correlation matrix is reported in Table 5. The numbers in bold are
significant at the 0.05 level.
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6. Empirical results
We present the empirical results in three parts. The first part estimates factors impacting
movie-DVD window lengths in a first stage, that serves as consumer expectations for movieDVD release times for the dynamic structural model. Next, we report the estimates of the
dynamic structural model. Finally, we present results around the counterfactual analysis to
evaluate the optimal movie-DVD release window for the “average” movie from the point of
industry revenues.
6.1. Determinants of window lengths and other state variables
In this section, we report the maximum likelihood estimates of the first-stage estimation
of the stochastic process that generates the state variables in the DVD period. Table 7 presents
the empirical determinants for the theater-to-DVD window length. Leg has a significantly
positive effect on the window length; quantitatively, a one-week increase in the leg of a
movie’s theatrical run leads to approximately 1.1 weeks’ increase in the actual window length
set by studios. Opening box-office revenue has practically no effect on the window length by
itself, but it modifies the marginal impact of Leg. This implies that if a wide-release
blockbuster movie’s box-office performance decays fast, it tends to be released on DVD even
faster than a movie that attracts a smaller audience; on the other hand, if it maintains a
relatively high momentum at the box office, than its DVD release tends to take an even longer
time, presumably because the studio wants to extract more revenue from the theatrical movie.
The viewers’ rating of a movie has a significantly positive effect on the window length: a
lower-rated movie is released faster on DVD than a higher-rated movie. The trend variable is
significantly negative across all specifications, consistent with our previous observation that
there has been a general trend towards a shorter theater-to-DVD window at the industry level.19
Star presence, MPAA ratings and genres do not seem to affect window length (except that
drama and science-fiction movies seem to have a longer window than other genres). Among
the seven major studios, Studio 1 seems to have the shortest window, whereas Studios 3 and 5
have significantly longer windows than non-majors (whose dummy is normalized to zero).
These studio fixed effects may reflect the differences in studios’ strategies on setting the
19
Some industry insiders claimed that the trend towards a faster DVD release is caused by an ever-shortening
movie leg at the box-office. Our results indicate that the claim is untrue. First, even controlling for the movie leg,
the trend variable has a significantly negative coefficient. Second, we also performed a simple regression of the
movie leg against a time trend, and the trend variable is not significant, i.e., there is no evidence that movies’ legs
have been shortening during our sample period.
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theater-to-DVD windows; however, such differences are rather small in magnitude. Given that
consumers typically do not pay attention to the identity of the studio when making
consumption decisions about movies and DVDs, we exclude these studio fixed effects and
report the estimates in the third column. The coefficients are very similar to those in the first
column. Since most of the movie covariates are insignificant, we further exclude them and
focus on movie’s opening strength, leg, viewer rating, and trend; the estimates of this more
parsimonious specification are reported in the third column. This small set of estimates is used
to compute consumers’ expectations about window lengths.
Table 8 presents the coefficient estimates for DVD retail price. Opening box-office
revenue has a significantly negative effect on price, which may result from the fact that
retailers are more likely to use popular DVDs as loss leaders to boost store traffic. DVDs of the
action movies are priced (about 2%) lower than DVDs of other genres on average. There is
also a significant trend towards lower DVD retail prices: each new quarter leads to about 1%
decrease in price.
Table 9 reports the estimates for the box-office gross revenue. Since consumers tend to
infer the quality (or mass appeal) of the movie from its total theatrical demand, we empirically
estimate the effects of the movie covariates that influence the eventual demand and use them to
generate consumer expectations during the theatrical run. As expected, the opening-weekend
box-office revenue strongly determinants the overall revenue of a theatrical movie; one percent
increase in the opening-weekend revenue leads to 0.9% increase in the overall revenue. A
movie’s leg also has a substantial impact on the overall market demand: one week’s increase in
a movie’s leg leads to about 19% (exp(0.176)-1) increase in its total theatrical demand.
Viewers’ ratings also positively influence a movie’s theatrical demand. R-rated movies tend to
have lower demand in general. Comedy movies seem to attract a larger audience, whereas
dramas tend to attract a smaller audience, compared to movies of other genres.
6.2. Estimates of the dynamic structural model
Table 10 presents the current-period utility parameters for viewing theatrical film.
Studios’ marketing strategies such as the number of exhibitor screens (capturing the
“availability” of a movie) and movie advertising expenditure have substantial effect on a
movie’s appeal to consumers. Star power rating has a significantly positive effect, as expected.
Critical review seems to have a negative effect while the viewer rating has a significant effect.
Seasonality factors are also important. Among various film genres, thrillers, horror movies, and
28

comedies appear most popular for movie-goers. There is considerable amount of heterogeneity
across consumers in their preference strength for stardom. The decay rate is estimated to be
highly negative, but the dispersion parameter is statistically significant, indicating that
consumers’ have very heterogeneous valuations for the “newness” of the movie.
Table 11 presents the utility parameters for DVD rental and for DVD purchase (for
collection). As predicted, the box-office gross of a movie has a significantly positive effect on
both the renting and buying utilities of the DVD. This is consistent with the industry
observation that theatrical release is a marketing exercise for the DVD. This is further
manifested by the fact that theatrical revenue has a larger effect on collection utility than on
viewing utility.
Consistent with the perishability hypothesis, a longer window reduces both renting and
buying utility. The coefficients correspond to a monthly 7.3% and 5.6% discount rate for
renting utility and buying utility, respectively; for instance, a four-month decay in DVD release
can reduce the value of DVD rental by 26% and that of DVD purchase by 22%.
Star power has a significant effect on renting utility but has no effect on buying utility. Rand PG13-rated movies appear to be more attractive to DVD viewers, as compared to G- and
PG-rated movies. However, while R-rated movies are more likely to be bought than G- and
PG-rated movies, PG13-rated movies are not. Interestingly, sequels actually offer lower DVD
viewing and buying utility. Among the various movie genres, thrillers and war movies have
greater appeal, while dramas have the lowest appeal.
Among the content enhancement provided on the DVD, deleted scenes seem to be valued
by both viewers and collectors. Music videos, on the other hand, mainly appeal to collectors.
Price coefficient is estimated to be significantly negative. Filmmaker commentary and
children’s games increase the likelihood of buying but have no effect on the likelihood of
renting.
Table 12 reports the estimates for parameters that dynamically link the theatrical period
and the DVD period utilities. The five estimates are related to the substitution effect ( SE ). The
constant is estimated to be significantly positive, indicating that, on average, the consumer’s
utility from the DVD would be reduced after having viewed it in theater, suggesting that DVD
is at least partially substitutable with the theatrical movie. Viewers’ rating, however, has a
significantly negative sign, suggesting that a highly rated movie is less substitutable. The
animation genre also has a negative sign, meaning that animation movies on average induce
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less satiation after theatrical viewing. R-rated movies, on the contrary, are more substitutable,
i.e., once consumers have viewed these in theater, they are unlikely to view it on DVD again.
There is substantial amount of consumer heterogeneity in the degree to which consumers view
the sequential releases as substitutable. The forward-looking parameter, l , is estimated to be
significantly positive, suggesting that the consumers are indeed forward-looking in their movie
consumption decisions. Therefore, a change in the theater-to-DVD window would affect
consumers’ movie-going decisions since they tend to optimize their utilities over time rather
than behave myopically.
6.3. Policy Analysis: The Optimal Theater-to-DVD window
Given the structural demand parameters, we perform a policy analysis, where we simulate
the market demand for theatrical movies and DVDs under industry-wide shorter windows. The
other variables, such as product attributes, advertising and prices, are fixed exogenously at the
observed value in the sample. The consumer expectations are assumed to be adaptive to the new
window regime, as described in the model section. When simulating for the new windows, we
reduce the average window by 3 to 18 weeks while still allowing for the movie-specific variation
in window length and also in consumers’ expectations across movies, through the change in a
movie’s box-office sales pattern.
Table 13 presents the predicted market outcomes; the implication for revenue is graphed
in Figure 4. We find that industry revenues are a convex function in the window length reduction,
with an optimum at around 12 weeks. Since the average window length in our sample is 5.5
months, a 12-week reduction in window length would imply an optimal industry-level average
window of about 2.5 months.
Our analysis thus yields insights about the tradeoffs involving optimal inter-release times.
On the one hand, for the period of the data, it shows that proponents of the theory that studios
have gone too far in reducing window lengths are incorrect. On the other hand, the argument
proposed by certain industry executives that there is very little cannibalization and therefore
studios should simply release movies and DVDs simultaneously is flawed as well. We find that,
because of the prominent role played by consumers’ rational expectations, the studios should
wait a few weeks after the movie has typically gone out of the theater before releasing the movie
on DVD. However, given that the cannibalization problem is more than balanced by the
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reduction in buzz that affects DVD sales in the current scheme, it does not make sense to delay
DVD releases as much as the average in the data of about 4.5 months.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we develop a structural demand model to empirically solve the inter-release
timing problem between sequentially introduced products. The model incorporates consumers’
forward-looking choice behavior with rational, adaptive expectations, the possibility of multiple
purchases, as well as a rich structure of consumer heterogeneity.
Methodologically, we propose a parsimonious approach to augment the market-level
aggregate data with consumer-level attitudinal (survey) data to improve model identification. In
addition, we extend Berry (1994)’s contraction mapping algorithm from a static demand context
to a dynamic setting to ensure that the individual’s choice probabilities are dynamically
consistent within the estimation framework.
We apply the model to the motion picture industry to address the issue of the inter-release
time between a theatrical movie and its DVD version. We obtain several insights from the
estimates of the structural model that informs movie-DVD release timing. First, we find that
indeed consumers are forward-looking and have adaptive expectations about inter-release times.
As studios shorten inter-release times, consumers do adjust their behavior, supporting the notion
that shrinking windows cause DVD sales to cannibalize theatrical demand. Second, consumers
dynamically adjust their expectations in a Bayesian learning fashion specifically incorporating
new information about movie inter-release times. Countering the loss of box-office demand due
to the shrinking windows is the stronger buzz for DVDs with the shorter window; as buzz decays
at a rate of about 5.6% a month for DVD rentals and 7.3% a month for DVD sales. Finally, based
on the structural estimates, a policy analysis shows that given current consumer preferences, the
theater-to-DVD window that maximizes the industry revenue is about 2.5 months on average.
There are several future research directions that appear promising. First, in this paper we
focus on the theatrical market and home-video market; the two channels combined currently
generate nearly 90% of the studios’ revenues from feature movies at the time of the sample.
With the rise of streaming, many new questions arise. For example, our model treats the
evolution of DVD hardware installation base as exogenous; i.e., we do not explicitly model the
consumer’s decision to adopt the DVD player in order to view DVDs at home. Since our focus
is on the effect of inter-release time on sequential product demand, such a modeling
31

simplification should not be problematic.20 Karaca-Mandic (2004) and Inceoglu and Park
(2003) address the indirect network externalities of DVD player adoption and DVD software
availability and uses data from the early years of DVD introduction. Since our data cover a
later period of 2001-2003, almost all major-studio feature movies were released on DVD;
therefore, such network effect is less of a concern if the DVD release is a given and only its
timing is uncertain. However, treating the hardware adoption and software consumption in an
integrated fashion would be desirable in an evolving market. Interestingly, given the adoption
of streaming, hardware adoption will be replaced by subscriptions to services such as Netflix
and Amazon Prime, but now, the purchase price is no longer relevant for many movies with
streaming as the movies are available with subscription. Our model needs to be adapted to
consider the time-cost of watching streaming home video along with purchase and rental prices
for movies.
Second, we focus on the inter-release time between a movie and its DVD version, but we
do not explicitly model the competition between various DVDs. Since a DVD not only faces
competition from other DVDs released around the same time, but also faces competition from
contemporaneous box-office releases (Luan and Sudhir 2006), solving a full equilibrium model
of the release timing decision of DVDs, which should both account for the optimal interrelease time and for time-varying competitive sets, becomes exceptionally difficult. This issue
becomes even more significant in the streaming context. We hope this paper will serve as a
starting point to solve a variety of managerially relevant problems given the rapid changes in
home distribution of movies.

20
Leaving the hardware adoption decision out of the current framework might be problematic if the trend towards
a shorter theater-to-DVD window induces consumers to adopt the DVD player earlier than they otherwise would,
which subsequently increases the demand for DVD software titles. However, this effect is not identifiable with our
current data.

32

References
Ainslie, A., X. Dreze, and F. Zufryden (2004), "Modeling Movie Lifecycles and Market
Share," Marketing Science, Forthcoming.
Berry, S. (1994), "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation," Rand
Journal of Economics, 25(2), 242-62.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995), "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium,"
Econometrica, 63(4), 841-90.
Boone, D. S., K. N. Lemon, and R. Staelin (2001), "The Impact of Firm Introductory Strategies
on Consumers' Perceptions of Future Product Introductions and Purchase Decisions," Journal
of Product Innovation Management, 18(2), 96-109.
Chellappa, R. K. and S. Shivendu (2003), "Economic Implications of Variable Technology
Standards for Movie Piracy in a Global Context," Journal of Management Information
Systems, 20(2), 137-68.
De Vany, A. and C. Lee (2001), "Quality Signals in Information Cascades and the Dynamics
of the Distribution of Motion Picture Box Office Revenues," Journal of Economic Dynamics &
Control, 25(3-4), 593-614.
Drasgow, F. Ed. (1986), Polychoric and Polyserial Correlations: Wiley.
Einav, L. (2004), "Gross Seasonality and Underlying Seasonality: Evidence from the U.S.
Motion Picture Industry," Working Paper, Stanford University.
---- (2003), "Not All Rivals Look Alike: Estimating an Equilibrium Model of the Release Date
Timing Game," Working Paper, Stanford University.
Eliashberg, J., A. Elberse, and M. A. A. M. Leenders (2005), "The Motion Picture Industry:
Critical Issues in Practice, Current Research and New Research Directions," Working Paper.
Erdem, T., M. P. Keane, and J. Strebel (2004), "Learning About Computers: An Analysis of
Information Search and Technology Choice," Working Paper, UC Berkeley.
Foutz, N. Z. and V. Kadiyali (2003), "Competitive Dynamics in Optimal Release Timing of
Motion Pictures," Working Paper, Cornell University.
Gelman, A., J. B. Carlin, H. S. Stern, and D. B. Rubin (2003), Bayesian Data Analysis, (2nd
ed.). Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Gentzkow, M. (2004), "Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: Online
Newspapers," Working paper, Harvard University.

33

Gilbert-Rolfe, J., U. Merchant, and V. Moroian (2003), "Drivers of Marketing Spending in
Motion Pictures," The Anderson School of Business, UCLA.
Gowrisankaran, G. and M. Rysman (2005), "Determinants of Price Declines for New Durable
Consumer Goods," Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis.
Harris, K. M. and M. P. Keane (1999), "A Model of Health Plan Choice: Inferring Preferences
and Perceptions from a Combination of Revealed Preference and Attitudinal Data," Journal of
Econometrics, 89(1-2), 131-57.
Hartmann, W. R. (2004), "Intertemporal Effects of Consumption and Their Implication for
Demand Elasticity Estimates," Working paper, Stanford University.
Hendel, I. and A. Nevo (2002), "Sales and Consumer Inventory," NBER Working Paper No.
9048.
Inceoglu, F. and M. Park (2003), "Diffusion of a New Product under Network Effects: The
Case of U.S. DVD Player Market," Working Paper, Boston University.
Israel, M. (2005), "Who Can See the Future? Information and Consumer Reactions to Future
Price Discounts," Working Paper, Northwestern University.
Karace-Mandic, P. (2004), "Network Effects in Technology Adoption: The Case of DVD
Players," Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley.
Keane, M. P. (1997), "Modeling Heterogeneity and State Dependence in Consumer Choice
Behavior," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 15(3), 310-27.
Knox, G. and J. Eliashberg (2004), "Consumers Rent Vs. Buy Decision: The Case of Home
Video," Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Krider, R. E. and C. B. Weinberg (1998), "Competitive Dynamics and the Introduction of New
Products: The Motion Picture Timing Game," Journal of Marketing Research, 35(1), 1-15.
Kurt, I. (2004), "Video Industry on the Way to Another Record Year," Video Store Magazine,
26(30), 8.
Lehmann, D. R. and C. B. Weinberg (2000), "Sales through Sequential Distribution Channels:
An Application to Movies and Videos," Journal of Marketing, 64(3), 18-33.
Luan, J. Y. and K. Sudhir (2006), "Forecasting Advertising Responsiveness for Short LifeCycle Products," Working Paper, Yale University.
McBride, S. (2004), "'Noel,' in Theaters and Self-Erasing Discs," The Wall Street Journal, 18
October, 2004.

34

Melnikov, O. (2000), "Demand for Differentiated Durable Products: The Case of the U. S.
Computer Printer Market," Working Paper, Department of Economics, Yale University.
Moorthy, K. S. and I. P. L. Png (1992), "Market-Segmentation, Cannibalization, and the
Timing of Product Introductions," Management Science, 38(3), 345-59.
Mortimer, J. H. (2004), "Price Discrimination and Copyright Law: Evidence from the
Introduction of DVDs," Working paper, Harvard University.
Neelamegham, R. and P. Chintagunta (1999), "A Bayesian Model to Forecast New Product
Performance in Domestic and International Markets," Marketing Science, 18(2), 115-36.
Nevo, A. (2001), "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,"
Econometrica, 69(2), 307-42.
Norton, J. A. and F. M. Bass (1987), "A Diffusion Theory Model of Adoption and Substitution
for Successive Generations of High-Technology Products," Management Science, 33(9), 106986.
Olsson, U. (1979), "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Polychoric Correlation
Coefficient," Psychometrika, 44, 443-60.
Orbach, B. Y. and L. Einav (2002), "Uniform Prices for Differentiated Goods: The Case of the
Movie-Theater Industry," Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper.
Padmananbhan, V. and F. M. Bass (1993), "Optimal Pricing of Successive Generations of
Product Advances," International Journal of Research in Marketing, 10(2), 185-207.
Prasad, A., B. Bronnenberg, and V. Mahajan (2004), "Product Entry Timing in Dual
Distribution Channels: The Case of the Movie Industry," Review of Marketing Science, 2,
Article 4.
Radas, S. and S. M. Shugan (1998), "Seasonal Marketing and Timing New Product
Introductions," Journal of Marketing Research, 35(3), 296-315.
Rao, A. (2015). Online content pricing: Purchase and rental markets. Marketing Science, 34(3),
430-451.
Rust, J. (1987), "Optimal Replacement of Gmc Bus Engines - an Empirical Model of Harold
Zurcher," Econometrica, 55(5), 999-1033.
Sawhney, M. S. and J. Eliashberg (1996), "A Parsimonious Model for Forecasting Gross BoxOffice Revenues of Motion Pictures," Marketing Science, 15(2), 113-31.
Seetharaman, P. B. (2003), "Probabilistic Versus Random-Utility Models of State Dependence:
An Empirical Comparison," International Journal of Research in Marketing, 20(1), 87-96.

35

Song, I. and P. K. Chintagunta (2005), "Measuring Cross-Category Price Effects with
Aggregate Store Data," Working Paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
---- (2003), "A Micromodel of New Product Adoption with Heterogeneous and ForwardLooking Consumers: Application to the Digital Camera Category," Quantitative Marketing
and Economics, 1(4), 371-407.
Sudhir, K. (2001), "Competitive Pricing Behavior in the Auto Market: A Structural Analysis,"
Marketing Science, 20(1), 42-60.
The Digital Entertainment Group (2005), "DEG Highlights,"
http://www.dvdinformation.com/Highlights/index.cfm.
Weiss, A. M. (1994), "The Effects of Expectations on Technology Adoption: Some Empirical
Evidence," Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(4), 341-60.
Wilson, L. O. and J. A. Norton (1989), "Optimal Entry Timing for a Product Line Extension,"
Marketing Science, 8(1), 1-17.
Zufryden, F. S. (1996), "Linking Advertising to Box Office Performance of New Film
Releases - a Marketing Planning Model," Journal of Advertising Research, 36(4), 29-41.

36

Tables

Table 1
Key Descriptive Statisticsa
Variable

Mean Median Std. Dev.

Theater-to-DVD Window (days)

Max. Min.

165.37

158.00

41.44

405

88

DVD Sales, 4 Weeks (mils. )

0.72

0.32

1.20

8.97

0.01

DVD Sales, 6 Months (mils.)b

0.99

0.50

1.50

11.29

0.01

19.84

19.60

1.89

33.98 14.16

DVD Rentals, 4 Weeks (mils.)

2.87

2.55

1.67

7.68

0.35

DVD Advertising (TV GRPs)

273.2

94.5

415.9

2560

0

Box-Office Revenue ($ mils.)

55.05

34.56

58.20 404.76

5.11

Theatrical Release Advertising ($ mils.)

19.65

18.69

9.80

63.35

0

Number of Opening Screens

2255

2480.5

844.6

3876

41

Production Budget ($ mils.)

41.46

35.00

31.01

200

0.16

Star Power Rating (0-100)d

56.52

59.09

27.63

100

0

Viewer Ratinge

6.07

6.10

1.14

8.9

2.4

f

Critical Rating

5.42

5.00

2.14

9.40

1.10

Oscar Nominations

0.57

0

1.73

13

0

Oscar Awards

0.12

0

0.58

6

0

DVD Retail Price ($)
c

a
b
c

Sample consists of 526 new DVD titles released between 2000/1 and 2003/10.
The correlation coefficient between the first four-week sales and 6-month sales is 0.992.
Rental volumes are only available for 265 titles; from Video Business magazine

d

From Hollywood Reporter (2002)

e

From www.imdb.com.

f

From www.metacritic.com.
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Table 2
Description of Categorical Variables
Genres

Variable
Action
Adventure
Animation
Comedy
Crime
Documentary
Drama
Fantasy
Horror
Music/Musical
Romance
Sci-Fi
Thriller
War

MPAA Ratings R
PG 13
PG
G
DVD Extras

Mean
0.23
0.13
0.06
0.44
0.15
0.01
0.42
0.06
0.10
0.02
0.17
0.10
0.27
0.03
0.43
0.41
0.12
0.04

Making-of Documentary
Filmmaker Commentary
Deleted Scenes
Music Video/Isolated Score
Interactive Features/Games

Sequel

0.69
0.74
0.52
0.32
0.13
0.10
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Table 3
DVD Market Shares
Studio
Warner Home Video
Buena Vista
Universal
Fox
Sony
Paramount
MGM
Others
Source: Video Business (2004)

39

Total sales
(billions)

Market
share

$4.21
$3.38
$3.07
$2.76
$2.63
$1.96
$1.11
$1.77

20.2%
16.2%
14.7%
13.2%
12.6%
9.4%
5.3%
8.5%

Table 4
Consumer Survey Data: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Category

Mean

(1) Preference for movie-going

"Like Very Much"
"Like Somewhat"
"Don’t Like it Very Much"
"Do Not Do It At All"

0.30
0.41
0.14
0.15

(2) Preference for video-watching

"Like Very Much"
"Like Somewhat"
"Don’t Like it Very Much"
"Do Not Do It At All"

0.38
0.43
0.09
0.10

Polychoric correlation coefficient b/w (1) and (2)a

0.45

Favorite movie genres

Action/Adventure
Animated
Comedy
Drama
Horror/Suspense
Musical
Romance
Science Fiction
Foreign

0.60
0.18
0.68
0.49
0.28
0.20
0.31
0.28
0.06

Importance for choose movies

Stars/director
Advertising
Critic Review
WOM
Awards/Nominations

2.00
1.92
1.61
2.33
1.58

Importance for choose videos

Stars/director
Advertising
WOM
Awards/Nominations

2.06
1.77
2.26
1.54

Likelihood of repeat watching

"Rarely"
"Sometimes"
"Frequently"

0.33
0.45
0.22

a

The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.40.
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Table 5
Polychoric Correlation Coefficients between Attribute Weights
Star
Ads
WOM
Rewatch
Movie
DVD

Star
1
0.498
0.571
-0.143
0.166
0.274

Ads

WOM

Rewatch

Movie

DVD

1
0.563
-0.083
0.135
0.245

1
-0.063
0.14
0.203

1
-0.024
-0.067

1
0.398

1

Table 6
A Sample of Movie Legs and Windows (in weeks)
Lega
Window
Title
1.9
20.6
Charlies Angels (2000)
0.9
15.6
Formula 51
3.4
28.6
Gladiator
4.4
26.6
Green Mile
1.6
21.6
Lara Croft: Tomb Raider
3.8
21.6
Meet The Parents
1.7
23.9
Mission Impossible 2
8.6
29.6
Nowhere In Africa
2.1
19.6
Perfect Storm
5.2
35.6
Quiet American, The
1.2
18.6
Rules Of Attraction, The
2.5
25.6
Runaway Bride
2.0
22.6
Scary Movie
5.5
33.6
Sixth Sense
3.4
17.6
Stuart Little
2.6
32.9
Tarzan
1.6
16.9
Wash, The
2.9
27.6
What Lies Beneath
1.6
18.6
X-Men
Note: a Maximum-likelihood estimates for the scale parameter of
Weibull distribution are taken as measure of movie leg, as shown in Eq.
(27).
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Table 7
Determinants of the Theater-to-DVD Window
24.974**

(1.314)

26.336** (1.120)

26.404** (0.578)

Leg

1.154**

(0.172)

1.143** (0.175)

1.184** (0.169)

ln(OpeningBoxOffice)

0.021

(0.297)

0.104

0.079

ln(OpeningBoxOffice)*Leg

0.209**

(0.059)

0.201** (0.060)

0.195** (0.059)

Viewer Rating

0.885**

(0.294)

0.941** (0.303)

0.918** (0.225)

Trend

-0.236**

(0.051)

-0.240** (0.053)

-0.242** (0.051)

Star

-0.026

(0.099)

-0.033

(0.102)

0.018

(0.133)

0.015

(0.136)

MPAA_R

-0.027

(0.848)

-0.542

(0.864)

MPAA_PG13

-0.170

(0.787)

-0.515

(0.803)

Sequel

0.082

(0.797)

0.309

(0.816)

Action

-0.665

(0.613)

-0.850

(0.631)

Fantasy

1.203

(0.945)

1.124

(0.972)

Romance

0.446

(0.652)

0.640

(0.669)

Thriller

-0.049

(0.631)

-0.003

(0.647)

Comedy

0.237

(0.596)

0.251

(0.615)

Drama

0.176

(0.600)

0.411

(0.617)

Animation

0.059

(1.157)

0.312

(1.186)

-0.995

(1.356)

-1.029

(1.390)

Intercept

Critic

War

(0.304)

Drama

4.166*

(2.353)

5.045** (2.383)

Horror

0.262

(0.872)

0.183

(0.892)

SciFi

1.551*

(0.793)

1.576*

(0.817)

*

(0.954)

Studio 1

-1.806

Studio 2

1.041

(0.901)
**

Studio 3

2.309

Studio 4

1.765*
**

(1.000)
(1.038)

Studio 5

2.603

Studio 6

1.524

(1.046)

Studio 7

1.789

(1.229)

sˆW2

(0.242)

(0.908)

4.948

5.110

Notes: * p<.1; **p<.05. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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5.112

Table 8
Determinants of DVD Pricea
3.088**

(0.017)

**

-0.011

(0.004)

Star

0.001

(0.002)

Critic

0.000

(0.002)

Viewer_Rating

0.005

(0.004)

MPAA_R

0.004

(0.014)

-0.003

(0.013)

0.012

(0.013)

Intercept

ln(OpeningBoxOffice)

MPAA_PG13
Sequel

**

Action

-0.021

(0.010)

Fantasy

-0.011

(0.015)

0.003

(0.011)

Thriller

-0.017

(0.010)

Comedy

0.001

(0.010)

Drama

0.004

(0.010)

Animation

-0.001

(0.019)

War

-0.017

(0.022)

Drama

-0.045

(0.038)

Horror

0.005

(0.014)

Sci_Fi

-0.008

(0.013)

Trend

-0.010**

(0.001)

Romance

**

sP

0.081

(0.021)

Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of DVD
retail price. * p<.1; **p<.05. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 9
Determinants of Box-Office Grossa
3.612**

(0.064)

ln(Opening Box Office)

0.902

**

(0.017)

Leg

0.176**

(0.006)

**

(0.017)

Intercept

Viewer_Rating

0.105

Trend

0.000

(0.003)

Star

0.009

(0.006)

Critic

0.000

(0.008)
**

MPAA_R

-0.148

MPAA_PG13

-0.048

(0.046)

Sequel

0.005

(0.046)

Action

-0.013

(0.036)

Fantasy

0.004

(0.055)

Romance

0.032

(0.038)

Thriller

0.018

(0.037)

Comedy

0.079**

(0.035)

Drama

0.028

(0.035)

Animation

-0.033

(0.068)

War

-0.022

(0.079)

Drama

-0.256*

(0.135)

Horror

0.043

(0.051)

Sci_Fi

-0.047

sB

0.291

(0.049)

(0.046)
**

(0.106)

Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of box-office
gross revenue. * p<.1; **p<.05. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 10
Theatrical-Movie Utility Parameters
-13.256** (0.141)

Intercept
ln(Ad_Spend)

0.248** (0.034)

Star

0.080** (0.008)
-0.017*

Critic

**

Viewer_Rating

(0.010)

0.042

(0.020)

MPAA_R

-0.101*

(0.061)

MPAA_PG13

-0.021

(0.056)

Sequel

-0.084

(0.052)

Action

-0.073

(0.046)

Fantasy

-0.097

(0.059)

**

Romance

-0.173

(0.048)

Thriller

0.132** (0.046)

Comedy

0.215** (0.042)

Drama

0.048

(0.043)

Animation

0.114

(0.076)

War

-0.122

(0.103)

Documentary

-0.235

(0.197)

Horror

0.125** (0.061)

Sci-Fi

0.050

Spring

0.251** (0.055)

Summer

0.179** (0.049)

Fall

0.101*
**

(0.056)

(0.052)

Holiday

0.236

ln(Screens)

1.124** (0.015)

Decay_Rate

-0.438** (0.008)

Heterogeneity dispersion
Constant

0.177
**

(0.059)

(0.141)

Star

0.115

Decay_Rate

0.265** (0.011)
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(0.017)

Table 11
DVD Utility Parameters
Rental
Intercept
ln(OpeningBoxOffice)
Window
Star
Critic

-0.972**

Collection

(0.400)

1.931**

(0.834)

**

(0.016)

**

1.106

(0.020)

-0.075**

(0.029)

-0.061**

(0.012)

**

(0.005)

-0.010

(0.006)

-0.015**

(0.007)

-0.015*

(0.008)

0.624
0.031

**

(0.017)

(0.046)

0.171**

(0.049)

**

(0.043)

**

-0.110

(0.044)

Sequel

-0.356**

(0.042)

-0.143**

(0.044)

Action

**

(0.027)

**

0.172

(0.033)

(0.048)

0.271**

(0.055)

**

(0.038)

**

(0.041)

0.199**

(0.030)

0.084**

(0.040)

(0.030)

**

-0.103

(0.038)

Viewer_Rating
MPAA_R
MPAA_PG13

Fantasy
Romance
Thriller
Comedy
Drama
Animation
War

-0.015

(0.019)

0.577**
0.466
-0.066

0.080*
-0.091
0.026
-0.027

-0.043

-0.187

(0.027)

-0.024

(0.033)

**

(0.121)

0.012

(0.105)

0.153**

(0.062)

0.235**

(0.063)

(0.120)

**

-0.160

(0.071)

-0.638

**

Drama

-0.436

Horror

0.013

(0.038)

0.057

(0.051)

Sci_Fi

0.037

(0.037)

0.009

(0.047)

Commentary

0.038

(0.028)

0.092**

(0.033)

**

(0.023)

**

0.066

(0.027)

-0.102**

(0.028)

0.172**

(0.030)

**

Del_Scenes
Music

0.071

Games

0.209

(0.136)

0.300

(0.131)

Trend

-0.257**

(0.010)

-0.524**

(0.015)

-2.302

**

(0.288)

-0.022

*

(0.013)

ln(Price)
d0
c0

0.151**
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(0.07)

Table 12
Dynamic Linkage Parameters
Substitutability parameters (SE)
Constant
0.153 ** (0.213)
Viewer Rating
-0.120 ** (0.034)
Animation
-0.312 ** (0.135)
R-Rated
0.110 * (0.065)

s g2

0.113

**

(0.050)

Forward-looking parameter

l

-5.739 ** (1.985)

Table 13
Simulated Effects of Window Reduction
Reduction in Change in
the Average
theater
Window
admission per
(Weeks)
movie (000)
0
3
6
9
12
15
18

Change in
DVD Sales

Change in
DVD Rentals

Industry
Revenue

-206.75

0.00
45.80
88.50
133.50
190.55

0.00
32.50
68.30
99.21
122.10

-310.28

240.30

159.39

-380.40

261.90

170.20

0.00
42.48
77.59
98.88
105.90
89.41
51.70

0.00
-35.82
-79.21
-133.83

Table 14
Windowing Schedule of a Typical Movie
Version
Theatrical Exhibition
Home Video
Pay-Per-View (or Video-on-Demand)
Pay-TV (e.g., HBO)
Network/Syndication
47

Release Time
Initial debut
5 months later
8 months later
12 months later
2-3 years later

Figures
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Figure 1

DVD Hardware Installation Base in the U.S.
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Figure 2: Histogram of Theater-to-DVD Windows
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Figure 3: Weibull Fitting of Box-Office Sales
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Figure 4
Effect of Window Reduction on All Movies
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